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Abstract 
This article argues that until recent times, the Estonian media policy has mainly been interpreted as an economic issue 
and it did not account for the strategic need to build a comprehensive media field to serve all groups in society. This has 
happened despite the fact the Estonian media policy is in line with the European Union (EU) media policy, which should 
ensure freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism. Findings of the Estonian case study show that 
despite these noble aims, Estonia has two radically different information fields: one for Estonian speaking audiences 
and one for Russian speakers. Events in Ukraine have added to the democratic media policy paradigm a question of na-
tional security. Now it is a challenge for the policy makers to unite polarised media fields and how to minimise the im-
pact of Russian propaganda. On the EU level, one supportive measure could be a revision of the Audiovisual Media Ser-
vice Directive. 
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1. Introduction 
To establish the background for this paper, a brief 
overview of Estonian population trends is useful. Be-
fore World War II, Estonia was a relatively homogenous 
nation-state; 88.1 per cent of Estonia's 1.3 million in-
habitants were Estonians (Estonian Statistics, 2015). 
Estonian was the national language. The war led to 
drastic changes: from the 1940s onwards, after being 
incorporated into the Soviet Union, Estonia lost nearly 
one-fifth of its population due to mass repression, war 
activities and political exile. Mass immigration from the 
Soviet Union's member republics, especially from the 
Russian Federation, made Estonia's population multi-
national in a few decades (Tiit, 2011). The newcomers 
were mainly Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, who 
spoke Russian. In the Soviet Union, the Russian lan-
guage had the status of being the language of commu-
nication between and within different nations, mean-
ing that in practice Russian was used as the official lan-
guage. The Soviet era, which lasted for 45 years, 
brought about the development of two language 
communities: Estonian and Russian. In 2014 from a to-
tal of 1.3 million people, 29.6% of the Estonian popula-
tion has Russian as their mother tongue (Tammur, Äär, 
& Meres, 2015). The article confronts the issue of the 
differences of the media fields of the two languages 
and researches the consequences of the separation 
and discusses the possible reasons for the situation. 
Based on the collected data and analyses, the article 
makes concrete suggestions for the improvement of 
the European media policy. 
Iosifidis (2013) argues that cultural policy theories 
understand media and communication from a national 
perspective and largely neglect the global element, 
whereas Manning (1999, p. 138) contends that one as-
pect of globalisation refers to the transnational regula-
tory systems and the diffusion of a liberal political ide-
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ology and institutional forms. Iosifidis (2013) suggests 
globalisation processes, including market-liberalism 
and free trade policies, have ended up in a situation 
where the regulatory agencies shift away from public 
interest measures and normative principles towards 
more rigorous, yet narrow, economics-based assess-
ments of market power. This is another reason for the 
emergence of competition policy as the preferred 
mechanism to manage issues in media and communi-
cation at the expense of sector-specific structure and 
content (Iosifidis, 2013). Van Cuilenburg and McQuail 
(2003) argue that the nature of public interest has 
changed and that new communication policies aiming 
to serve the public interest are biased towards eco-
nomic values. Presently, the forces of economic ration-
ality and globalisation have undermined the original 
national culture of public service broadcasters (Lowe & 
Martin, 2014). This change in media policy has put ex-
tra pressure on policy makers (Curran, 1997; Harcourt, 
2005), especially when discussing the remit and fund-
ing of public-service broadcasting (Picard, 2002). Set by 
the Estonian Public Broadcasting Act (2007), one of the 
obligations of Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) is “to 
meet the information needs of all sections of the popu-
lation, including minorities”. Today, ERR broadcasts in 
Russian on one radio channel and one daily TV news 
programme, and thus has arguably enabled ERR to ful-
fil its obligation towards the minority language audi-
ence. Debates consider possible broader offerings, 
such as a Russian language TV channel, mainly as an 
economic issue (Ajutrust Konsultatsioonid, 2007). This 
output aimed to serve 29.5 per cent of the Estonian to-
tal population (1.3 million) who declare that their na-
tive language is Russian (Estonian Statistics, 2015). In 
addition, 16 per cent of Russian-speaking people claim 
they do not understand Estonian at all (Lauristin, Viha-
lemm, Ainsaar, & Heidmets, 2011). However, as 
Jufereva and Lauk (2015, p. 63) state, “Russian-
language media are not typical minority media which 
aim to maintain the language and cultural traditions of 
a minority, since Russian is the official language spoken 
by millions right across the border, and satellites make 
a variety of Russian television channels available”.  
There are positive examples of cross-border televi-
sion that is progressive with cultural consequences 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2013), but the separation of Russian-
speaking audiences from the Estonian information field 
caused by foreign Russian channels creates many chal-
lenges for Estonian society. Gitlin (1999) argues 
whether democracy requires a public or a set of pub-
lics, a public sphere or “separate public sphericules”. 
The latter are possible, but according to the Haber-
masian theory of the public sphere, these sphericules 
must also have a higher communication space or 
sphere, otherwise there will be isolated “islands of dif-
ferent groups” in society. There is the argument that if 
there are no ongoing negotiations among members of 
different groups, media can act as a facilitator. Media 
policy should be developed to support these communi-
cation processes and to secure media stakeholders’ 
adequate performances. Jõesaar, Jufereva and Rannu 
(2014) argue the development of Russian-language 
media in Estonia after regaining the country’s inde-
pendence can be seen as a market failure in an im-
portant sector of everyday life. According to Integra-
tion Monitoring, 50 per cent of Russian speakers 
cannot follow media (print, online, radio and televi-
sion) in Estonian because of an insufficient knowledge of 
the language (Vihalemm, 2011). Data from studies 
(Jõesaar, 2014; Saar Poll, 2014; Seppel, 2015) show that 
linguistically different population groups are in different 
information fields. These information fields are separat-
ed not only by linguistic but also national borders. Any 
argument must admit that the language division has its 
roots in the Soviet era, when the non-native population 
settling in the USSR’s republics consumed mostly pan-
Soviet media. The establishment of liberal media princi-
ples in re-independent Estonia ended undemocratic su-
pervision and gave media independence.  
2. Challenges of the Small Market 
One of the prerequisites to the aforementioned change 
was economic independence subjected to free market 
principles. While media companies targeting an Estoni-
an language audience were able to emerge, the situa-
tion for the Russian-language media in the Estonian 
free market, due to the smaller target audience, 
proved disadvantageous. Interests of Russian speakers 
are mainly served by Raadio 4, the Russian language 
public-service radio channel. The limited size of the 
target audience, around 350,000 people, makes broad-
casting in the Russian language an unprofitable activity 
for commercial broadcasters; therefore, there are no 
private nationwide television programmes in Russian. 
The amount of viewers of national or local Russian lan-
guage broadcasts is insufficient to rouse the interests 
of advertisers. In addition, cross-border cable and sat-
ellite TV offer fierce competition, making Russia’s TV 
channels accessible to the Russian-speaking audience 
in Estonia. This however does not fulfil the duties of a 
democratic media system. Information and debate on 
the development and functioning of Estonia’s society 
could only come from domestic media. When the 
availability of creative resources, market conditions 
and an economic atmosphere are not favouring com-
mercial media, this kind of market failure should be 
balanced by public service media (Croteau & Hoynes, 
2001; Lowe & Nissen, 2011). As already mentioned, 
ERR has a limited Russian language output. The situa-
tion will change after ERR receives extra funding from 
the state budget for its third TV channel, Russian lan-
guage ETV+, which will be launched in autumn 2015. 
After more than two decades of political debate 
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around the need for a Russian language TV channel 
(Jõesaar et al., 2014), the ground-breaking political de-
cision was not made on the basis of the recognition of 
the minority language group’s information needs, but 
was driven by the events in Ukraine and increasing 
wave of Russian propaganda. In the summer 2014, Es-
tonia was dragged into a conflict situation, which Lons-
dale (2004) and Snow (2003) describe as an infor-
mation war, one declared by Russia on the Western 
world. Therefore, the issue now is not only about the 
enhancement of the media system in a democratic so-
ciety serving all population groups, but also the recent 
events that have put this issue into the national securi-
ty domain. Furthermore, the problem of how to handle 
Russian propaganda and how to avoid its influence on 
citizens is an EU wide responsibility. In Estonia and in 
other Baltic states, the influence of Russian propagan-
da on the Russian speaking audience is a major con-
cern. There is no mutual understanding about the role 
and possible impact of Russian language television 
programmes, yet Russian television channels do enjoy 
significant popularity among Russian speaking audi-
ences (Saar Poll, 2014; Seppel, 2015). How, by whom 
and to what extent programmes in the EU members 
states for language minorities are created is a political 
issue, which is influenced by internal and external se-
curity questions, overall economics and EU media poli-
cy. The overall aims of the Pan-European media policy 
are to preserve cultural diversity and safeguard media 
pluralism. The main European legislative document, 
the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and 
its predecessor The Television Without Frontiers Di-
rective, does not take into account country-specific cir-
cumstances, such as geopolitical location, size of the 
national media market, economic conditions and the 
cultural and historical contexts. However, these are 
important factors, which have a strong influence on 
media development and performance. In countries 
with insufficient resources, a market-driven media sys-
tem is incapable of presenting a full range of political 
and economic interests in the public domain, especially 
for language minorities. 
3. Broadcasting in Estonia: Two Isolated Information 
Spheres 
From the 29th of July to the 5th of August, 2014, the 
research company Saar Poll OÜ conducted a national 
public opinion study (Saar Poll, 2014). In the form of 
telephone interviews, 1000 people aged 15−74 were 
surveyed, of whom 505 were Estonians and 495 were 
Russian speakers. For both groups, the proportional 
random sampling method was the selection process. 
Saar Poll conducted the interviews in either Estonian or 
Russian. To compensate for the differences that arose 
in the process of comparing the results of the ques-
tionnaire and the statistical model, the outcome was 
weighed across the socio-demographic indicators. In 
compiling the model of socio-demographic indicators, 
data from the population register was used, as it was 
provided on 30.01.2014. The study was commissioned 
by the Estonian Open Foundation. The topics of the 
survey were current events, following news and the 
media, and the importance of different sources of in-
formation for the residents of Estonia. One of the re-
search questions of the study was to compare the me-
dia worlds of Estonians and Russian speakers. 
Results show that Estonia has experienced challeng-
es in providing pluralistic and reliable content for society 
as a whole, especially for the Russian-speakers and that 
the frequency of following the news among Estonians 
and Russian speakers is relatively similar (Figure 1). As 
expected, there are differences in the sources of in-
formation that Estonians and Russian speakers consid-
er important for following current events (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of following the news. Source: Saar Poll (2014). 
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Figure 2. Importance of the media channels among Estonians and Russian speakers. Source: Author’s calculation based 
on Saar Poll (2014). 
Television is the prime source for both Estonians and 
Russian speakers. But, whereas Estonians consider Es-
tonian Television to be the main source of information 
(81 per cent of respondents consider it very important 
or rather important), Russian speakers look Russian 
state television channels (72 per cent of respondents 
consider it very important or rather important). 
Thus, it is possible to argue that the EU media poli-
cy aiming to guarantee media pluralism and diversity 
needed for the development of democracy has failed 
those member states, in which a significant proportion 
of the population is strongly attracted to the non-
European information field. 
The Saar Poll study (2014) also asked participants 
who, in their opinion, was responsible for shooting down 
the Air Malaysia flight over eastern Ukraine. A large 
share of respondents did not know how to respond to 
the question (40 per cent of Estonians and 47 per cent of 
Russian speakers). This is evidence of how, regardless of 
ethnicity, significant proportions of population have dif-
ficulty forming an opinion based on the information that 
they have. Among those respondents with an opinion, a 
distinct difference is present (Figure 3): 
• Estonian respondents stated that either the 
Russian government (34 per cent of respondents) 
and/or the Ukrainian separatists (31 per cent of 
respondents) were responsible. 
• Russian speaking respondents primarily stated the 
government of Ukraine was responsible (38 per 
cent of respondents). 
Another market specific issue is the control of the con-
centration of media ownership (Doyle, 2002). In Esto-
nia, control over market dominance and measures to 
minimise the risk caused by the dominant players are 
absent. Consequently, Russian state channels hold a 
dominant and almost monopolistic position among Es-
tonia’s Russian-speaking audience (Figure 4). 
The conclusion is that Estonia has experienced chal-
lenges in providing pluralistically reliable content for the 
Russian-speaking part of society. The result indicates 
that a significant proportion of the Russian-speaking au-
dience is not inside the national internal information 
sphere, but is in the Russian state information sphere. 
Therefore, in Estonia, two radically different information 
fields exist: one is in line with information provided and 
shared by free and independent European journalism 
and the other is in favour of Russian state propaganda. 
Paradoxically, the legal framework established by the 
AVMSD guarantees the existence of both. The EU media 
regulation is aimed to be universal and it does not take 
into account market-specific aspects. The AVMS Di-
rective should help to achieve the objectives of the EU. 
The Directive should ensure freedom of information, di-
versity of opinion and media pluralism, but as shown 
earlier the Directive has failed to be an efficient tool to 
protect EU citizens against disinformation from third-
party countries, which is disseminated with the aim of 
gaining political influence over member states’ citizens. 
The EU media policy is not solely responsible for the 
situation, because it leaves much of the decision mak-
ing power to the member states. Estonians have cho-
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sen liberal and minimalistic media regulation. The posi-
tive outcome of the media policy is that Estonia’s press 
freedom index is high (Freedom House, 2013). On the 
negative side, the media offering to the Russian-
speaking audiences is insufficient. Due to market fail-
ures, the Estonian private sector is unable to serve lan-
guage minorities with pluralistic media content. Suc-
cessive governments have paid little attention to this 
issue and have shown only moderate desire to grant 
the necessary funds for the ERR; for which reason ERR 
has been unable to fulfil its remit to serve minority in-
terests. Today, the situation has changed, but it is evi-
dent that it will be hard for the ERR at once to rectify 
deficiencies of the past two decades. 
 
Figure 3. Response to the question: In your opinion, who is responsible for shooting down the Air Malaysia plane? (N = 
all respondents. Since each respondent could give more than one answer, the sum of percentage can be over 100). 
Source: Saar Poll (2014, Figure 19). 
 
Figure 4. Average weekly share of viewing in Estonia in 2014. Age group 4+, Estonians and Russian speakers. Source: 
Author’s calculations based on TNS Emor data (2015). 
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This article argues that the Estonian government’s 
“idealisation” of market forces, which is supported by 
the EU’s media policy and driven by a common market 
ideology, has limited the offering of quality local con-
tent and does not take into account media companies’ 
actual abilities to provide a large range of media ser-
vices for all of society.  
4. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the AVMSD should be revised to prevent 
unfair competition that stems from third-party coun-
tries. In addition, tools should be developed to avoid 
undue media concentration and to compensate for 
market failures. The unfair competition posed by the 
rebroadcasting of Russian television programmes 
should actually go under competition law, but it is ex-
tremely difficult to take any action against third-party 
country broadcasters on that legal basis. In case com-
petition law is hard to implement, other measures 
should be targeted to reinforce the Estonian audiovis-
ual media sector; in particular, public service media 
should be developed. Additional financial resources 
should help the ERR to make the transition from a tra-
ditional public service broadcasting (PSB) company into 
a public service media company, introducing new inno-
vative services on all platforms (Ibrus & Ojamaa, 2014) 
and to better serve the interests of the Russian-
speaking population. On the EU level, there are no 
binding mechanisms dictating the minimum funding 
level a member state should guarantee for the PSB. 
There are no EU financial instruments, as there are, for 
example, solidarity funds for infrastructure develop-
ment dedicated to the enhancement of the public ser-
vice media. Decisions on the remit, funding model and 
funding level of PSB are left to a member state.  
Without the support of the EU’s strongly binding 
legal instruments, Estonia’s PSB would lack the funding 
required to achieve the same powerful and legitimate 
position as Western European and Nordic PSBs (EBU, 
2015). Under these circumstances, instead of the Euro-
pean Commission’s concerns of possible violations of 
the state aid regulation in the context of overfunding 
PSBs (European Commission, 2009), there should be 
legal instruments to ensure that PSBs are not under-
funded. In cases of underfunding, it is clear that PSB 
remits might not be fulfilled, as citizens’ rights to re-
ceive democratic and pluralistic content are not pro-
tected. 
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